| The Supreme Court established many of the most fundamental principles of American Constitutional law under the authority of Chief Justice John Marshall. Using the documents below and your knowledge of the court cases, define these basic principles. |
| That the people have an original right to
establish for their future government such principles as, in their opinion, shall most
conduce to the own happiness is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been
erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it nor
ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established are deemed
fundamental. And as the authority from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act,
they are designed to be permanent. This original and supreme will organize the government
and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here or
establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments. . . . The powers of
the Legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or
forgotten, the Constitution is written. . . . The distinction between a government with
limited and unlimited powers is abolished if those limits do not confine the persons on
whom they are imposed,. . . . It is a proposition too plain to be contested that the
Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it. . . . Marbury v. Madison, 1803 (USSC+) |
| The legislature of a State cannot annul the
judgments, nor determine the jurisdiction, of the courts of the United States. The Court
of Appeals in prize causes, erected by the Continental Congress, had power to revise and
correct the sentences of the State courts of admiralty. Although the claims of a State may
be ultimately affected by the decision of a cause, yet, if the State be not necessarily a
defendant, the courts of the United States are bound to exercise jurisdiction. If the
legislatures of the several states may at will annul the judgments of the courts of the
United States, and destroy rights acquired under those judgments, the Constitution itself
becomes a solemn mockery, and the Nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by
the instrumentality of its own tribunals. United States v. Peters, 1809 (USSC+) |
| The question whether a law is void for it's
repugnancy to the Constitution is at all times a question of much delicacy, which ought
seldom, if ever, to be decided in a doubtful case. The Court, when impelled by duty to
render such a judgment, would be unworthy of its station could it be unmindful of the
solemn obligations which that station imposes. But it is not on slight implication and
vague conjecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers,
and its act to be considered void. The opposition between the Constitution and the law
should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility
with each other. Fletcher v. Peck, 1810 (USSC+) |
| It has been said that the people had
already surrendered all their powers to the State sovereignties, and had nothing more to
give. But surely the question whether they may resume and modify the powers granted to the
Government does not remain to be settled in this country. Much more might the legitimacy
of the General Government be doubted had it been created by the States. The power
delegated to the State sovereignties were to be exercised by themselves, not by a distinct
and independent sovereignty created by themselves. To the formation of a league such as
was the Confederation. the State sovereignties were certainly competent. But when,
"in order to form a perfect union," it was deemed necessary to change this
alliance into an effective Government, possessing great and sovereign powers and acting
directly on the people, the necessity of referring it to the people; and of deriving its
powers directly from them, was felt and acknowledged by all. The Government of the Union
then (whatever may be the influence of this fact on the case) is, emphatically and truly,
a Government of the people. In form and in substance, it emanates from them. Its powers
are granted by them, and are exercised directly on them, and for their benefit. McCulloch v. Maryland, 1819 (USSC+) |
| Although, among the enumerated powers of
Government, we do not find the word "bank" or "incorporation," we find
the great powers, to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to
declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies. The sword and the
purse, all the external relations, and no inconsiderable portion of the industry of the
nation are intrusted to its Government. It can never be pretended that these vast powers
draw after them others of inferior importance merely because they are inferior. Such an
idea can never be advanced. But it may with great reason be contended that a Government
intrusted with such ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and
prosperity of the Nation so vitally depends, must be intrusted with ample means for their
execution. . . . If, indeed, such be the mandate of the Constitution, we have only to
obey; but that instrument does not profess to enumerate the means by which the powers it
confers may be executed; nor does it prohibit the creation of a corporation, if the
existence of such a being be essential, to beneficial exercise of those powers. it is,
then, the subject of fair inquiry how far such means may be employed. McCulloch v. Maryland, 1819 (USSC+) |
| A corporation is an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature
of law, it possesses only these properties which the charter of its creation confers upon
it, expressly or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best
calculated to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most important are
immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties by which a
perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single
individual. They enable a corporation to manage its own affairs and to hold property
without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity of perpetual
conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand. It is chiefly for the
purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these qualities and capacities that
corporations were invented and are in use. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1819 (USSC+) |
| From the fact, then, that a charter of
incorporation has been granted, nothing can be inferred which changes the character of the
institution or transfers to the government any new power over it. The charter of civil
institutions does not grow out of their incorporation but out of the manner in which they
are formed and the objects for which they are created. The right to change them is not
found on their being incorporated but on their being the instruments of government,
created for its purposes. The same institutions, created for the same objects though not
incorporated, would be public institutions and, of course, be controllable by the
legislature. The incorporating act neither gives nor prevents this control. Neither, in
reason, can the incorporating act change the character of a private, eleemosynary
institution. . . . it is a contract made on a valuable consideration. It is a contract for
the security and disposition of property. It is a contract of the faith of which real and
personal estate has been conveyed to the corporation. It is then a contact within the
letter of the Constitution, and within its spirits also, unless the fact that the property
is invested by the donors in trustees for the promotion of religion and education, for the
benefit of persons who are perpetually changing, though the objects remain the same, shall
create a particular exception, taking this case out of the prohibition contained in the
Constitution. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1819 (USSC+) |
| The acknowledged inability of the
government, then, to sustain itself against the public will and, by force or otherwise, to
control the whole nation is no sound argument in support of its constitutional inability
to preserve itself against a section of the Nation acting in opposition in the general
will. That the United States form, for many and for most important purposes, a single
nation has not been denied. In war, we are one people. In making peace, we are one people.
In all commercial regulations, we are one and the same people. In many other respects, the
American people are one; and the government which is alone capable of controlling and
managing their interests in all these respects is the government of the Union. It is their
government, and, in that character, they have no other. America has chosen to be, in many
respects and to many purposes, a nation; and for all these purposes her government is
complete; to all these objects, it is competent. The people have declared that in the
exercise of all powers given for these objects it is supreme. It can, then, in effecting
these objects, legitimately control all individuals or governments within the American
territory. The constitution and laws of a state, so far as they are repugnant to the
Constitution and laws of the United States, are absolutely void. These states are
constituent parts of the United States; they are members of one great empire—
for some purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate. Cohens v. Virginia, 1821 (USSC+) |
| The power of regulating commerce extends to
the regulation of navigation. The power to regulate commerce extends to every species of
commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, and among the
several States. It does not stop at the external boundary of a State. But it does not
extend to a commerce which is completely internal. The power to regulate commerce is
general, and has no limitations but such are prescribed in the Constitution itself. The
power to regulate commerce, so far as it extends, is exclusively bested in Congress, and
no part of it can be exercised by a State. A license under the acts of Congress for
regulating the coating trade gives a permission to carry on that trade....The power of
regulating commerce extends to navigation carried on by vessels exclusively employed in
transporting passengers. The power of regulating commerce extends to vessels propelled by
steam or fire as well as to those navigated by the instrumentality of wind and sails.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (USSC+) |
| A treaty is in the nature of a contract
between two nations, not a legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the
object to be accomplished, especially so far as its operation is infra-territorial, but is
carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument.
In the United States, a different principle is established. Our Constitution declares a
treaty to be the law of the land. It is consequently to be regarded in courts of justice
as equivalent to an act of the legislature whenever it operates itself, without the aid of
any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contact, when
either of the parties engage to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to
the Political, not the Judicial Department, and the Legislature must execute the contract
before it can become a rule for the Court. Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 1829 (USSC+) |