| An Evaluation of the French Revolution |
| SOURCE: William Doyle, The Oxford History of the French Revolution, pp. 423-425. Copyright 1989.Reprinted by permission of Oxford
University Press. |
Although most would say that rapid and vast changes occurred during the French Revolution, it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which these changes were more apparent than real. In the following selection William Doyle attempts to strike a balance between what was and was not accomplished by the revolution. |
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The shadow of the Revolution, therefore, fell across the whole of the nineteenth
century and beyond. Until 1917 few would have disputed that it was the greatest revolution in
the history of the world; and even after that its claims to primacy remain strong. It was
the first modern revolution, the archetypal one. After it, nothing in the European world
remained the same, and we are all heirs to its influence. And yet, it can be argued, much
that was attributed to it would in all probability have come about in any case. Before
1789 there were plenty of signs that the structure of French society was evolving towards
domination by a single elite in which property counted for more than birth. The century-
long expansion of the bourgeoisie which underlay this trend already looked irreversible;
and greater participation by men of property in government, as constant experiments
with provincial assemblies showed, seemed bound to come. Meanwhile many of the
reforms the Revolution brought in were already being tried or thought about by the
absolute monarchy—law codification, fiscal rationalization, diminution of venality, free
trade, religious toleration. With all these changes under way or in contemplation, the
power of government looked set for steady growth, too—which ironically was one of the
complaints of the despotism-obsessed men of 1789. In the Church, the monastic ideal
was already shriveling and the status of parish priests commanding more and more
public sympathy. Economically, the colonial trade had already peaked, and failure to
compete industrially with Great Britain was increasingly manifest. In other structural areas,
meanwhile, the great upheaval appears to have made no difference at all. Conservative
investment habits still characterized the early nineteenth century, agricultural inertia and
non-entrepreneurial business likewise. And in international affairs, it is hard to believe that
Great Britain would not have dominated the worlds seas and trade throughout the
nineteenth century, that Austro-Prussian rivalry would not have run much the course it did,
or that Latin America would not have asserted its independence in some form or other,
if the French Revolution had never happened. In all these fields, the effect was to
accelerate or retard certain trends, but not to change their general drift. |
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